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‘THE SINEWES OF TRUTH’:  
BINDING LAW AND EMOTION IN THOMAS TOMKIS’S LINGUA 
 
Toria Johnson, University of Birmingham 
 
ABSTRACT: This essay traces the intersections of truth, law, and emotion in Thomas Tomkis’s 
1606 play Lingua: Or the Combat of the Tongue and the Five Senses for Superiority, in which the title 
character appeals for full status as a Sense. Moments of judgment structure the play, and suggest 
an overarching effort to seek truth in spite of the muddiness introduced by deceitful senses and 
heightened emotion. Although the bulk of the play emphasizes the volatility of the Five Senses, 
their susceptibility to emotion, and the unreliability of the ‘truths’ they report, it is Lingua who is 
ultimately ‘contained’ by the play’s legal structures. Nonetheless, Tomkis invites us to consider 
this vision of law’s power as little more than a fantasy.  
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Modern critics of Thomas Tomkis’s university play Lingua: Or The Combat of the Tongue, And the 
Five Senses for Superiority (1606) have almost exclusively focused on the play’s problematic 
treatment of its only female character, Lingua.1 Lingua tracks the progress of its titular character 
(representing the power of speech) in her ongoing appeal to be recognized as another ‘Sense’ 
alongside Auditus, Visus, Gustus, Tactus and Olfactus (Hearing, Sight, Taste, Touch and Smell, 
respectively).2 In an effort to distract the Senses long enough to clear the way for a private 
audience with, and ruling from, Communis Sensus (Common Sense, who acts in a judiciary 
capacity within the human body — ‘Microcosmus’ — in which the play is set), Lingua leaves a 
crown and a robe for the Senses to find. The crown’s inscription, ‘Hee of the five that proves 
himself the best, | Shall have his Temples with this Coronet blest’, prompts an emotionally 
charged argument between the Senses that is only, ultimately, resolved by the intervening 
judgment of Communis Sensus.3 Dissatisfied with that resolution, Lingua interferes further — 
drugging the Senses, prompting them to wage war against each other, and bringing chaos to 
Microcosmus. After confessing in her sleep, Lingua is found guilty and finally sentenced to 
imprisonment in Gustus’s ‘house’ (the mouth). She is, throughout the play, the only female 
character onstage; though the text briefly references the ‘great Queen Psyche’ (Lingua, sig. A3r) at 
the outset, she never materializes. We are only ever shown Lingua as a lone woman in the 
company of male characters.  
As we might expect of an allegorical representation of the power of speech, Lingua’s 
language throughout the play — particularly in the scenes in which she is making her case — is 
marked by a well-reasoned eloquence. Her language, however, while powerful is also pointless: 
rather than engaging with her arguments, the other characters of Tomkis’s play consistently 
discount her on the grounds of her sex. ‘There is no attempt to present arguments to counter 
Lingua’s reasoned propositions’, as Sarah Carpenter has noted; ‘anti-feminism is offered as a 
(theatrical) answer in itself’.4 At times this anti-feminist attitude is presented baldly, as when the 
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five established Senses submit articles against Lingua as proof that she cannot be a Sense in her 
own right: the final, oft-quoted, and ‘worst’ charge they level against her is ‘that shee’s a Woman in 
every respect and […] not to bee admitted to the dignitie of a Sense’ (Lingua, sig. F3v, italics mine). 
The charge, of course, is conveniently irrelevant to the issue of Lingua’s capacity to be a Sense. 
As Erin Ellerbeck has argued, the accusation’s force and placement — coming as it does at the 
end of a much longer list of alleged transgressions — serves only to make clear that ‘[Lingua’s] 
femininity amplifies her other crimes’. 5  The play understands ‘dignitie’ and womanhood as 
straightforwardly incompatible terms, and in many ways the play’s central academic debate, over 
whether speech might be considered a sense in its own right, is overshadowed by the question of 
whether a female character can be admitted into a privileged company of men.  
Elsewhere, the case against Lingua specifically, and women more generally, is made most 
clearly by Lingua herself, as in this passage, worth quoting at length:  
LINGUA   Fie Lingua wilt thou now degenerate: 
Art not a woman, doost not love revenge, 
Delightfull speeches, sweet perswasions 
I have this long time usd to get my right, 
My right that is to make the Senses sixe; 
And have both name and power with the rest. 
Oft have I seasoned savorie periods, 
With sugred words to delude Gustus taste, 
And oft embelisht my entreative phrase 
With smelling flowres of vernant Rhetorique, 
Limming and flashing it with various Dyes, 
To draw proud Visus to me by the eyes: 
And oft perfum’d my petitory stile, 
With Civet-speech, t’entrap Olfactus Nose, 
And clad my selfe in Silken Eloquence, 
To allure the nicer touch of Tactus hand […]. 
(Lingua, sig. A4r–A4v) 
 
‘Fie Lingua’, she says to herself and to the audience; ‘Art not a woman, doost not love revenge?’. 
In a speech that neatly aligns both an appetite for revenge and manipulative skill with 
womanhood, we are offered a sensual depiction of Lingua’s feminine charms: her persuasions are 
‘sweet’; her words are ‘sugred’; she is ‘perfumd’ and ‘Silken’. There is a certain luxury to her 
language here, which offers a rich catalogue of images (Lingua, sig. A4r–A4v). It is striking, then, 
that this seductive language is so obviously threatening: the speech emphasizes deceit and 
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manipulation even as (or perhaps, precisely because) it deploys perfumed and sugary rhetoric. 
Lingua acknowledges that she tailors her language in order to ‘delude’, ‘draw’, ‘t’entrap’, and to 
‘allure’ the Senses. Her language is active: she seasons, she embellishes, she clothes herself in 
targeted, deceitful language. The overwhelming impression here is of an explicitly female, 
intentionally adversarial character, and with this in mind, many critics have read Lingua as 
expressing a male anxiety about the impact of unrestrained, unruly, and publicly accessible female 
speech. As Sarah Carpenter argues, the male Senses’s accusation that Lingua translates academic 
material into the vernacular suggests a worry that she ‘is dragging down the elite [male] 
community of academia, opening up access to its “hard misteries”, making it easy’.6 On this 
reading, the prestige of the academic community depends on its impenetrability, the rarity of 
accessing it. This worry about accessibility also clearly signals an intersecting worry about female 
accessibility, evidenced by the sexualized language attached to the accusation about translation: in 
translating academic content from Latin and into the vernacular, Lingua is said to have ‘most 
vilye prostituted’ the knowledge (Lingua, sig. F3r): she puts it forward to a common audience. The 
clarity of Lingua’s language — her ability to communicate information effectively — in this 
respect becomes a threat rather than a boon: she is too capably, and too readily, reporting what 
she knows to be true. 
The most recent wave of critical interest in Lingua traces the play’s preoccupation with 
language and communication, and offers a more detailed exploration of the gender dynamics at 
work here. This type of criticism tends to focus on the emblem of the tongue (which figures 
prominently in Lingua’s final punishment) as a physical object onto which all anxieties about 
feminine discourse and language are projected.7 Nonetheless, I believe that Lingua offers further 
opportunities for interrogation, particularly in the areas of law and emotion. I do not dispute the 
problematic gender attitudes at work in this play. However, it is possible both to supplement and 
to complicate the male-female binary at work here by attending to the interrelated system of law 
5 
BINDING LAW AND EMOTION IN THOMAS TOMKIS’S LINGUA 
 
and emotion at work in Microcosmus. Lingua is heavy-handed with its allegory, and while the 
repeated allusions to the tongue often make explicit the play’s interest in questions of gender, 
language, and access, there is an equal investment in questions of truth, reliability, sensory 
experience, and the regulation of feeling. These latter questions are all the more noteworthy 
because they occasionally undermine the stability of the male-female binary that otherwise 
dominates Tomkis’s piece. In its depiction of the interconnectivity between law and emotion, 
legal actors and emotional subjects, Lingua presents its characters as equally fallible, vulnerable, 
and emotionally permeable. Even the play’s judicial authority is affected, by association. 
Returning to the speech I quoted above, there is in fact more at work than a 
straightforwardly gendered account of Lingua’s duplicitous femininity. She is dangerous and 
manipulative, but the Senses are also clearly depicted as being vulnerable to her machinations. 
The very language that makes Lingua seem threatening — words like ‘delude’, ‘allure’, and 
‘entrap’ — also makes the Senses seem less allegorical and more human, more permeable and at 
risk of being compromised. This description of emotionally vulnerable Senses represents an 
unusual intervention in a broader seventeenth-century discussion of the reliability of the senses.8 
In addition to supplementing the play’s overarching interest in gender relations, Lingua’s 
exploration of truth (and the things that might cloud it) also pushes the early modern 
interrogation of sensory unreliability beyond epistemological concerns in order to present an 
unusually affective view of the perceptive body. In this essay, I argue that in Lingua, Tomkis on 
the one hand stages contemporary, commonplace worries about the reliability of the bodily 
senses, and their ability (or inability) to present a truthful account of the world beyond the body. 
On the other hand, his account of the emotionally susceptible Senses shows real innovation in 
binding together truth, emotion, and law. Through the chaos Lingua inflicts, Tomkis presents a 
clear link between sensory unreliability and emotional subjectivity.  The play highlights the 
impossibility of regulating the emotional subject completely within legal frameworks, but Lingua 
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is nevertheless ultimately “controlled” judicially at the play’s conclusion; Tomkis returns to the 
very fantasy of containment that the rest of the piece has methodically undermined. Using the 
backdrop of the human body, Tomkis thus narrates the desire for truth and the desire to make 
knowledge stable, tracking the pursuit of truth in emotional, legal, and sensory contexts.  
* 
 
Though the issue is persistently raised by Lingua, this worry about identifying the truth in spite of 
sensory unreliability is almost never acknowledged by any other character within the legalistic 
framework surrounding Communis Sensus, though of course it comes to have a major impact on 
all of the characters. The Senses’s authority derives from Communis Sensus’s judgment, but that 
judgment relies on sensory input that they have supplied. This is one of many points of 
allegorical breakdown in the play. For all that Communis Sensus is acknowledged as the play’s 
judicial authority, the legal structures at work in Microcosmus are often seen to be ineffective: 
Tomkis imagines both his individual characters, and the legal structures put in place to control 
them, as vulnerable to emotion, and unstable as a result. The Senses are an impactful example of 
this instability, not least because their primary function, in principle, is to provide information to 
the figurehead of the play’s central legal structure. In practice, however, Tomkis’s Senses are both 
over-emotional and under-sensual: throughout the piece they are defined by their inability to put 
aside their personal and emotional interests in order to prioritize their functional roles. In this 
way Lingua consistently shows Microcosmus’s legal structures under the influence of emotional, 
manipulative agents. Consider this exchange, between Lingua and Auditus: 
 
AUDITUS  Lingua confesse the truth, th’art wont to lie. 
 
LINGUA   I say so too, therefore I do not lye, 
But now spite of you all I speake the truth. 
You five among us subjects tyrannize, 
Making the sacred name of common sense, 
A cloake to cover your enormities: 
Hee beares the rule, hee’s judge but judgeth still, 
As hee’s informed by your false evidence: 
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So that a plaintife cannot have accesse, 
But through your gates hee heares but what, nought els 
But that thy crafty eares to him convaies, 
And all hee sees is by proud Visus shewed him: 
And what hee touches is by Tactus hand, 
And smells I know but through Olfactus nose,  
Gustus begins to him what ere he tastes: 
By these quaint tricks free passage hath been bard 
That I could never equally bee heard.  
(Lingua, sig. A3v)  
 
This moment comes early in the play, and represents one of Lingua’s first attempts to access the 
authority she needs to be classified as a Sense in her own right. In strident, direct language, she 
alleges that the existing five senses have conspired to bar her access to Communis Sensus, in his 
role as the play’s judicial authority. ‘Hee beares the rule’, Lingua observes of Communis Sensus 
(Lingua, sig. A3v). Nonetheless, she is quick to highlight the fallibility of this system of rule: ‘Hee’s 
judge’, she notes, ‘but judgeth still, | As hee’s informed by your false evidence’ (Lingua, sig. A3v, 
italics mine). The presiding judge of Microcosmus is compromised because he is unable to access 
independently ‘the truth’ of the matters over which he presides; his reliance on information 
conveyed by the Senses makes him vulnerable to the possibility of untruthful reporting. Lingua’s 
initial assertion, that the truth she speaks is ‘In spite of you all’, suggests her own independence 
as a truth-reporter, but of course the comment also implicates her own truth with the spite that 
later compels her to make mischief in Microcosmus. 
In some respects, Lingua’s complaint looks like a straightforward objection about access: 
faced with the deceptive, non-neutral, gatekeeping Senses, Lingua complains because she is 
(ironically) unable to make herself heard. The major disagreement here, however, is really over 
what constitutes ‘the truth’, who has the authority to determine it, and indeed, if it can ever be 
determined. There is a fundamental incompatibility between Lingua’s account of the truth and 
the ‘truth’ as the established Senses present it in Microcosmus. Lingua offers it as fact that the 
Senses are biased and self-serving, and that she herself has a just claim to the status of a Sense. 
For the actual Senses, nothing could be further from the truth, and indeed both their authority 
and their reputations depend on Lingua being wrong.    
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As far as this particular exchange reflects the broader problem of locating truth, the 
depiction of contradictory, competing truths is self-evident in the context of its theatrical 
presentation, where allegorical characters are made human. In an easy reading of this passage, 
then, there are multiple perspectives on the truth, each offered by a distinct character, and each 
of which is determined by a given character’s social aims (relating to their position within 
Microcosmus) and their emotional drives (such as greed, covetousness, or wrath). Lingua’s 
complaint is framed by her insistence that the community of Microcosmus is threatened or 
violated by the actions of the Senses, but her real concern might more accurately be described in 
this way: her account of the truth is not the accepted one, and because of this, the social power 
she seeks eludes her. Of course, the characters here are not just human; they are also allegorical, 
and what Tomkis offers in this scene is more than a simple (albeit heated) social exchange. 
Certainly in the case of the established Senses, these characters represent faculties that should 
operate beyond the reach of self-service and personal interest; we might hope that they offer us 
objective truths. By calling their integrity into question, Lingua is attacking more than the 
characters themselves: she also invites the audience to question the integrity of their own senses 
and the reliability of the information they offer.  
The impact of this passage — suggesting as it does a wide-ranging assortment of worries 
surrounding sensory perception, truth, judgment, emotion and community — registers all the 
more because the characters are explicitly framed in allegorical terms, and yet do not really 
function as allegory. Tomkis’s deployment of allegorical technique here fails, of course, because 
each of the Senses is portrayed by an actor with a full range of sensory perception, and a full 
emotional range. Staging the Senses therefore complicates rather than clarifies their depiction: 
invariably, the Senses look like the complex, muddled actors representing them, rather than 
straightforward physical capabilities. And yet, I suggest that what looks like technical ‘failure’ here 
in fact allows Tomkis to redirect the play towards a more vivid portrait of the sensory subject, a 
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subject whose judgments (even the most fundamental) are ultimately shaped and guided by 
emotion. Bearing the physicality of the actors portraying them, the Senses, the very faculties on 
which we all rely, the very senses that are directly engaged during a theatrical performance, 
become worryingly individual, more obviously driven by their own agency and competing 
agendas than committed to presenting a cohesive, objective vision of the world.  
According to Lingua, the Senses of Microcosmus ‘tyrannize’; they ‘cloake’ their crimes; 
they play ‘tricks’ and offer false evidence. Given the play’s setting in the human body, the 
deception Lingua attributes to Auditus and the other Senses is an intimate violation, a betrayal 
that compromises even the most basic trust in sensory judgment. This is an early invitation to 
question the veracity of our own perceptions, and to consider their fragility. If we might readily 
question our ability to know the truth when other agents are involved (as in a legal case, or any 
other social dispute), here we are confronted also with the possibility that we may not even be 
able to trust ourselves. Lingua imagines the body as a fractured collection of competing drives, 
embroiled in an ongoing power struggle. In this climate, truth is referenced frequently, even as it 
becomes so contested and corrupted that the concept becomes almost irrelevant. In Lingua’s 
words — ‘You five among us subjects tyrannize’ — we can see a pressing worry that pervades 
Tomkis’s play, a worry about the complete and utter control the senses have over our 
understanding of the world around us. As the play unfolds however, it becomes clear that there is 
an equal, perhaps more pressing concern about the control that emotions have over the senses. 
It is clear from this exchange between Lingua and Auditus that Lingua is more than a 
straightforward play about epistemology, and there is more at work in this exchange than a basic 
scepticism about the Senses’s ability to communicate accurate knowledge about Microcosmus. 
Tomkis’s characters are unusually passionate in this debate: Auditus accuses Lingua of being 
‘wont to lie’; in return, she accuses him of falsity. The heat in this confrontation nicely 
demonstrates just how emotional arguments about truth can be, even as it also offers the 
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worrying vision of a Sense acting emotionally rather than objectively. As the exchange between 
Auditus and Lingua draws to a close, Auditus scrambles to assert his dominance and superiority: 
her speech would be useless, he points out, ‘Had I not granted thee the use of hearing’; the words 
she wields are, he adds, ‘thy Children but of my begetting’ (Lingua, sig. A4r, italics mine).9 In spite 
of this assertion of power, in which Auditus suggests that he has more of a claim over Lingua’s 
‘Children’ as their begetter, this powerful stance quickly gives way to a more emotionally 
vulnerable position. When Lingua calls him a ‘Perfidious Liar’, Auditus calls to the heavens to 
‘looke on my distresse’ (Lingua, sig. A4r), inviting them to act as witness, drawing attention to his 
emotional turmoil, and making a spectacle of it. He exits shortly after, but the emotional impact 
is made clear by the auditory effects of his anger and upset:  
 LINGUA  Nay the loud cannoning of thunder-boults, 
Screeking of Wolves, howling of tortur’d Ghosts 
Pursue thee still and fill thy amazed eares  
With cold astonishment and horrid feares.  
(Lingua, sig. A4r) 
 
It is not just that Auditus translates the emotional resonance of the confrontation into sensory 
experience by raising ‘the loud cannoning of thunder-boults | Screeking of Wolues, howling of 
tortur’d Ghosts’; the reaction has a broader impact, permeating the landscape of Microcosmus. 
Auditus’s reaction morphs into an aggressive force that ‘pursue[s]’ and ‘fill[s]’. Emotion and 
sensation are easily conflated here, as Auditus’s feelings are translated into the sense he 
represents. It is not just that as a Sense he is overrun: the resulting sensory output, which escapes 
the body of the character himself to bleed out into Microcosmus’s landscape, is a clear reaction 
to the earlier emotional provocation.  
 The vulnerability of Tomkis’s Senses to emotional compromise is, in many ways, what 
makes the action of the play possible, and it is certainly the factor that enables Lingua’s 
machinations. That she is able to derail the Senses so easily only reaffirms their unreliability as 
neutral reporters to Communis Sensus. The repeated staging of the Senses’s volatility constantly 
reminds us of Lingua’s early complaint that the Senses provide the sole (to her mind, tainted) 
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flow of information to Communis Sensus. The play’s later scenes only reaffirm the vision of the 
Senses as a company of wholly manipulable characters, on whom no one can depend. Lingua’s 
final act of mischief sees the Senses drugged with ‘a bottle of wine mingled with such hellish 
drugges and forcible words, that whosoever drinkes of it shall bee presentlie possest with an 
inraged and mad kinde of anger’ (Lingua, sig. K1v). The surest way to weaken someone, by this 
reading, is to provoke them emotionally. According to Lingua, these ‘forcible wordes’ are partly 
responsible for eliciting this provocation. The result is each Sense’s utter forfeit of his core 
identity: as Appetitus reports, ‘Auditus is starke deafe, and wonders why Men speake so softly 
that he cannot here them: Visus hath drunke himselfe starke blind’ (Lingua, sig. K3r). If the entire 
conflict comes down to the balance of power in Microcosmus, then Lingua has effectively 
removed the Senses’s claim to authority. By stripping them of their sensory judgments, they 
become not just ineffective agents, but violent liabilities. Even more than this, in this moment 
Lingua makes the Senses more clearly affective than they are sensory, effectively demonstrating 
that it is possible to strip them of the very thing that should be fundamental and inviolable. Here 
and elsewhere, the Senses’s emotions overrule their allegorical function. Stripped of this function, 
the Senses begin to look like emotionally driven, out of control subjects: the very type of subjects 
that require Communis Sensus’s judiciary mediation.  
For each of the Senses, the significance of reliable sensory judgment cannot be 
overstated; it is the primary source of the Senses’s power in Microcosmus, the thing that permits 
them to rule rather than be ruled. In the earlier exchange between Auditus and Lingua, for 
example, the capacity to claim truth also becomes a powerful claim to authority and influence. 
Lingua’s assertion of her own truthfulness is also a bid for power, the very power that the Senses 
have seized as the community-appointed arbiters of information. Lingua speaks on behalf of that 
community — ‘us subjects’ (Lingua, sig. A3v)— which she deems to be ill-served by the Senses 
and their selective presentation of sensory information: ‘free passage’, she notes, ‘hath been 
12 
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barred’ (Lingua, sig. A3v, italics mine). The very accusation suggests an active imposition into the 
flow of information: it implies not just that characters are motivated to manipulate or interfere 
with the truth, but also that truth is vulnerable to this type of intervention, rather than 
independently stable. The conflict makes obvious the play’s stance on truth. Both characters 
present a tailored, convenient version of the truth, in some sense little more than a narrative, 
constructed for rhetorical effect. The “telling” component of truth-telling therefore becomes the 
more important component, a signifier of the subjective agent who crafts a truth to tell, and gains 
something from the telling. Nonetheless, both Auditus and Lingua continue to speak about truth 
as if it is inviolable, a concrete thing: both claim to present truth as a way of establishing their 
own credibility and gravitas. At the heart of this passage, then, is an understanding that truth (or 
at least, the authoritative claim to it) offers a sort of social currency, the means by which 
characters establish their positions within the community. As the play unfolds, however, the 
distance between truth and authenticity only widens.  
What is particularly striking in this specific conflict is the way it stages the intersections 
between truth, evidence, community, and legal judgment in the play. Lingua is quite clear in her 
accusation that the Senses present Communis Sensus with false, biased evidence. As a result, 
Communis Sensus’s judgment is compromised, ill-suited to the community of subjects it is 
intended to regulate and serve. In this passage between Auditus and Lingua, and indeed 
throughout the play, the individual drives of Tomkis’s Senses repeatedly threaten community 
wellness in Microcosmus, and an organizing structure that is imagined to be stable and reliable — 
in this case, the judicial authority of Communis Sensus — is shown to be worryingly susceptible 
at a foundational level. Tomkis stages these worries through the chaos of the warring Senses of 
Microcosmus, but, unable to resolve these worries, he is ultimately only able to conclude the play 
by returning to a fantasy of legally containing the unruly, emotional Lingua.  
 
* 
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Quest. What is the law? 
Answ. A net. 
 
Quest. What are the Lawyers? 
Answ. Burdars. 
 
Quest. What are the Clients? 
Answ. Birds. 
 
Quest. What is the Court where the Law is pleaded. 
Answ. The place where the nets are spred to take the simple and silly birds.10 
 
Despite the tongue-in-cheek tone of its author, in the 1598 Natural and Morall Questions and 
Answers we can see something of the legal attitudes at play in Lingua. The language of opening 
call-and-response — ‘what is the law? | A net’ — hinges on the idea of containment, and while 
the entire sequence quoted above suggests a certain amount of cynicism, recasting clients as 
‘simple and silly birds’, it also assumes that the law offers the capacity to control. The law (net) 
offers the method of containment; the lawyers (birders) become authoritative wielders of control; 
even the space of legal process is recast as a place where the uncontained go to be restrained. 
And yet, the classification of the clients as ‘simple and silly birds’ equally suggests delusion: these 
are structures that work against, rather than for them, and law becomes more a process of 
containment and exploitation, rather than a disinterested dispensary of justice. The legal 
structures at work on Lingua are equally exploitative, not a system of justice so much as a method 
of containing problematic and unruly subjects. 
For all that Lingua initially claims that her sole aim is access to legal process — that is, the 
opportunity to plead her case before Communis Sensus — the play’s main action is prompted by 
the supposed legal resolution that occurs when Lingua finally does present herself to Communis 
Sensus, and receives his judgment on her Sense-hood. This is a process of attempted (or even 
presumed) containment, the supposed final resolution of a drawn-out appeal. However, the 
process neatly demonstrates the dissatisfaction likely to come with a losing suit. Communis 
Sensus denies Lingua the status she craves, but only on the grounds that ‘The number of the 
Senses in this little world, is answerable to the first bodies in the great world: now since there bee 
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but five in the Universe […] therefore there can bee but five senses in our Microcosme’ (Lingua, 
sig. I3v-I4r).  The judgment, therefore, is not deliberative, but rather a mere numbers game: the 
substance of Lingua’s appeal is immaterial, and it is clear from Communis Sensus’s quick 
dismissal that the hearing is not, in truth, a space for impartiality. The implied corruption of this 
system might further be suggested by the fact that in spite of the character’s allegorical 
inheritance, Lingua never really seems to have a chance of successfully arguing her suit. As 
Bradin Cormack has written, ‘law is an art of persuasion, and has always availed of those means 
of persuasion discovered through rhetoric’.11 Here, however, the character representing rhetorical 
persuasion is the one whose appeals are consistently ignored. Within the play, Lingua references 
her esteemed position with lawyers when she lists them among ‘all her friends ready to importune 
[Communis Sensus] in my behalfe’ (Lingua, sig. F2r). That she is then shown to be so ill-served 
and ill-received in Microcosmus’s only legal sphere might further suggest that Tomkis imagines 
another force underpinning the legal process in the play. Communis Sensus makes his decision 
on the basis of what he believes he knows already. That the Judge of Microcosmus is capable of 
accepting certain information as truth without scrutiny is also signalled explicitly before his 
judgment on Lingua, when the Senses present their articles against her. Here particularly, the 
Senses’s claim over truth neatly circumnavigates the need to offer proof in support of the charges 
they make against her. Though many of the claims they offer might be read as libellous — in 
particular, ‘4.art Item that she’s a common whore and lets every one lie with her’ (Lingua, sig. F3v) 
— the Senses end their written accusation only with a signing note ‘That these Articles bee true 
wee pawne our honors’ (Lingua, sig. F3v, italics mine). Without pausing to deliberate, Communis 
Sensus immediately deems the ‘Shrewd allegations’ to be ‘un-answerable’ (Lingua, sig. F3v). The 
exchange makes explicit the extent to which Common Sense relies on and accepts all information 
supplied by the Senses as true — in this case, not even obviously sensory information. Although 
the judgment on Lingua is deferred to allow the Senses to make their own cases for superiority, 
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Lingua is actually never permitted to respond to the charges that are made against her. In fact, 
her silence between accusation and receiving judgment on her Sensehood is itself remarkable in 
its length: she is kept from speaking for eight scenes, or a span of time that accounts for almost a 
quarter of the play. Though she requests time to respond — ‘I beseech your honour let me 
speake’ — she is explicitly deterred from speaking before judgment is passed, as Communis 
Sensus replies: ‘I cannot stay so long’ (Lingua, sig. J3v). Both Communis Sensus and the newly 
reconciled Senses depart the stage immediately after the judgment is heard, without ever allowing 
Lingua the opportunity to acknowledge or respond. 
Rather predictably, then, Lingua (inwardly) refuses to accept the judgment in a speech 
that clearly demonstrates a clash between emotion and the law that seeks to regulate it:  
LINGUA   Why this is good by common Senses meanes, 
Lingua thou hast framed a perfect comedy 
They are all good friends, whom thou mad’st enemies, 
And I am halfe a Sense […] 
Was this the care and labour thou hast taken, 
To bring thy foes together to a banket, 
To loose thy Crowne, and be deluded thus, 
Well now I see my cause is desperate, 
The judgements past, sentence irrevocable, 
Therefore Ile be content and clap my hands, 
And give a Plaudite to their proceedings: 
What shall I leave my hate begun imperfect? 
So fowly vanquisht by the spitefull Senses?    
(Lingua, sig. I3v) 
 
Lingua’s response raises a worry about rejected containment: she denies that the appeal is over 
and vows to continue, and in so doing she drags the rest of the play along with her. Nonetheless, 
Communis Sensus’s earlier judgment is framed clearly as a final resolution. Even his conciliatory 
judgment, that ‘all women for [Lingua’s] sake shall have six Senses, that is seeing, hearing, tasting, 
smelling, touching, and the last and feminine sense, the sense of speaking’ (Lingua, sig. I4r, italics 
mine) intends to appease and close the matter even as it also delivers yet another misogynistic 
barb. As a result, we can see clearly a conflict between the emotion that prompts the need for 
legal intervention, and the finality that legal judgment requires in order to offer a sense of 
resolution. Lingua acknowledges the finality of the previous scene: ‘The judgements past, 
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sentence irrevocable’ (Lingua, sig. I3v). Moreover, she knows how she is expected to respond, as 
she is made audience, rather than actor: ‘Therefore Ile be content and clap my hands’ (Lingua, sig. 
I3v). Even so, emotional language permeates the speech: her reference to being ‘deluded’ suggests 
a sense of betrayal at the hands of Microcosmus’s justice system; she imagines that the ‘cause is 
desperate’; her defeat is ‘fowl’, and her adversaries ‘spitefull’. Even the way she frames her hatred 
— ‘my hate begun’ — gives a sense of an emotional reaction left unfinished, a feeling that is left 
to bleed into the scenes that follow. It is clear from this that rather than being contained, 
Lingua’s emotions have been unleashed by her engagement with legal process. Her conclusion, 
then, is hardly surprising: ‘Ile make them know mine anger is not spent’, she vows, ‘Lingua hath 
power to hurt, and will to do it’ (Lingua, sig. K1r). The play’s first attempt to resolve its central 
conflict, therefore, reveals a real worry about the law’s capacity to contain the emotion inherent 
in the conflicts it seeks to resolve. If Lingua’s original complaints are to believed, there is an 
additional anxiety about the law’s integrity as well: for all that Lingua’s characters compete for the 
favourable judgment of Communis Sensus, the play takes pains to highlight that these evaluations 
are, necessarily, shaped by the input of the Senses themselves.  
Critics of Lingua have long recognized the striking level of engagement between Tomkis’s 
play and its cultural and literary moment: in addition to the more obvious references to 
contemporary academic debates, the play also makes a number of more subtle allusions to its 
literary inheritance, including to William Shakespeare’s Macbeth (1606) and A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream (1595), and Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene (1590).12 In using truth to showcase this 
conflict between law and emotion, however, Tomkis’s play may also reflect the fact that 
contemporary attitudes about law were themselves equivocal, often questioning its ability to offer 
structure and resolution in the face of emotional (or over-emotional) agents, even while 
recognizing a lack of viable alternatives. Consider, for example, Thomas Churchyard’s 1596 
poem, The Honour of the Lawe, which offers an entirely idealistic vision of law, in which ‘law’ and 
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‘justice’ are used interchangeably:  
Wealth, praise and peace, are Justice handmaids all,  
Honor and fame, holds up milde Justice traine,  
Truth on each side, supports hir from a fall.13 
 
Churchyard imagines ‘Truth’ as the vital support structure to justice, but speaks confidently, 
without imagining a failing in that structure: this is a vision of law that is comfortingly stable, and 
reliable. And yet, other writers present a more skeptical view. Pierre Charron’s 1601 De la Sagesse 
[Of Wisdome], was translated and published in English in 1608, shortly after Lingua’s publication. 
Charron offers a much different account of law: 
In Justice, which cannot subsist, cannot be executed, without the mixture of some wrong, not onely Justice 
commutative, for that is not strange: it is after a sort necessarie, and men could not live and traffique 
together, without mutuall dammage, without offence, and the lawes allow of the losse which is under the 
moiety of the just price.14  
 
Charron’s description of the justice afforded by law omits any reference to truth, and instead 
takes a more practical view. Justice cannot be executed, he suggests, ‘without the mixture of some 
wrong’; ‘men could not live and traffique together, without mutuall dammage, without offence’. 
‘The lawes’, it seems, understand the inevitability of human conflict, and while they cannot 
dispense perfect justice, Charron seems to suggest that law is better than nothing. By the end of 
Lingua, Tomkis seems to have settled on a comparable position. 
 As I have suggested, the recognition of the possible failings of law is one of Lingua’s 
primary interests. This much is evident in the characters’ preoccupation with truth. Worries about 
the truth — concerns about how to locate truth, and how to be certain of its veracity — run 
throughout Tomkis’s play, and it is never clear that Communis Sensus is able to dispense an 
indisputable truth, even in spite of his position as the ‘Judge’ in Microcosmus. The characters are 
forever in doubt of the claims offered by others, and though references to truth abound, no one 
seems able to agree on how to access any form of knowledge that is not somehow compromised 
or shaped by another character’s personal agenda. When a sleeping Lingua confesses her ‘crimes’, 
for example, Phantastes remarks that Communis Sensus is about to receive information in the 
truest way possible: ‘My Lord will you believe your owne eares, you shall heare her answere me, 
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as directly and truly as may be’, (Lingua, sig. M3v, italics mine). Only by disarming her waking agency 
are the other characters able to discern the truth, and the fantastical convenience of this moment 
only confirms the difficulty of locating truth in the real, waking world. Although the play has 
consistently called into question the integrity of Microcosmus’s legalistic structures, it seems 
nevertheless to reach its conclusion without finding an alternative method of achieving a final 
resolution. Lingua’s all-too-convenient confession is a fantasy of truth-gathering, a moment that 
also conveniently redeems Communis Sensus’s original judgment against her (though of course, 
her guilt in stirring up the Senses should be separate to her appeal for Sensehood). Lingua’s 
confession also sanctions and facilitates the play’s return to a legal judgment as a means of 
achieving resolution: there is no need to discern the truth of the matter here, only a need to mete 
out punishment. Legal judgment, therefore, seems the obvious, almost easy answer. This time, 
Lingua’s inadvertent forfeit of the truth ensures the straightforward dispensation of justice. 
Communis Sensus sentences Lingua to ‘close prison’ and charges Gustus ‘to keepe her under the 
custody of two strong doors, and every day till she come to 80 yeares of age, see she be well 
garded with 30 tall watchmen, without whose licence shee shall by no meanes wagge abroad’ 
(Lingua, sig. M4v). The containment this time is both legal and physical; once again the 
proceedings are closed without affording Lingua the chance to speak. She is physically removed 
from the stage as the rest of the characters exit.  
 There is, however, one final complication in Tomkis’s overall exploration of the slippery 
complexity of truth, also occurring in the final judgment scene. When Lingua’s dishonest page 
(the tellingly-named Mendatio) receives his punishment for complicity, Communis Sensus 
declares that ‘though he shall strengthen his speeches with the sinewes of Truth, yet none shall 
beleeve him’ (Lingua, sig. N1v). As far as closing thoughts go, the remark nicely sums up the 
central paradox of Lingua. As a concept, truth carries a remarkable power: its strength is 
additionally signalled here by the use of ‘sinewes’. But of course, the truth is equally dependent 
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on its reception: its authority is immediately lost if it is not deemed credible. Is the truth, then, 
anything more than a social construction — something determined by the emotional agents who 
receive and interpret it? Or, does the slippery nature of truth, as it is demonstrated throughout 
Tomkis’s play, also make obvious the need of finding some structure that is at least nominally 
able to contain it, and make it concrete? As I have outlined here, the legal structures in place in 
Lingua are strikingly flawed. However, they are, ultimately, the only means by which the play is 
able to come to a close. The final imprisonment of Lingua — herself the primary source of chaos 
and unreliability in the play — is in many respects a fantasy: a fantasy of authority, a fantasy that 
imagines the possibility of containing the uncontainable. At its close, the play conspires to 
present an illusion of effective control, and in so doing it confirms the seductive appeal of the 
tidy resolution: law’s seeming ability to contain what might not ordinarily be contained.  
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